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In the Supre1ne Court of the
State of Utah

HOWARD ANDERSON, ET AL,
Petitioners and Appellants,

v.

NO.

UTAH COUNTY AND THE BOARD
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 0 F
UTAH CO·UNTY,
Respondents.

9549

1

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondents agree with the .A:ppellants' Statement of
Facts except to add the following:
Within a few weeks after the Utah County elections
were held in the fall of 1960, a suit was filed by the· unsuccessful Democratie candidates, Marcellus Nielsen and
David Greenwood, seeking to reverse the election result
(T. 35, 36). The Appellants were employees of the Utah
County Road Department under Nielsen, and all but one
gave money to help finance this lawsuit. Most gave amounts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of $60.00 or $100.00 each (Findings of Fact Par. 6, T. 36).
This, despite the fact that many of the employees who contributed :had been employed by Utah County under a previous Republican administration, had obtained Republican
party clearances and had been supervised by ~sterling D.
Jones as County Commission (T. 49-55).
Commissioner Jones testified that after these employees had seen fit to inject themselves into a suit to unseat
him that "I could not expect their loyalty, that they could
not be loyal to me"· (T. 33). The Trial Court found as a
fact that Jones and .through him the Utah County Commission 'had a dual motive in the firing-first, that the employees could not be entirely loyal, and second, because they
were members of the Democratic party and not members
of the Republican party (Findings of Fact par. 8).

STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION
IS NOT AN UNWARRANTED JUDICIAL VETO OF
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTION.
POINT II
THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTENT DO NOT REQUIRE THE INCLUSION OF ALL TYPES O~F ASSOCIATIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACf.
POINT

m

P0'LITICAL PARTIES ARE NOT CONTEMPLATED
BY THE ACT.
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POINT IV
EVEN IF THE STATUTE WERE TO COVER POLITICAL PARTIES, IT WAS NOT VIOLATED SINCE
THE APPELLANTS WERE D·ISCHARGED FOR TWO
REASONS, ONE POLITICAL AND THE OTHER NONPOLITICAL.
POINT V
IF UTAH'S "RIGHT TO WORK" LAW IS INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE POLITICAL PARTIES WITillN
THE PHRASE ''. . . ANY OTHER TYPE O:F ASSOCIATION . . ." IT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE
OF THE PO·LICE POWER.
ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT'S MEMORANJD1UM DECISION
IS NOT AN UNWARRANTED JUDICIAL V:ETO. OF
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTION.
We agree with the language of the Rowley case quoted
by the Appellants at page 11 of their brief. (Rowley vs.
Public Service Commission, 112 Utah 116, 185 Pac. 2nd
514). Particularly would we emphasize the language which
says:
"On the other hand, when the legislative intent
is not clear and certain, and a literal interpretation of
the language of the statute gives an absurd result, then
the court is justified in ~searching the enactment for
further indications of legislative intent. These indications can be determined by the wording ~If the act
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or by considering the underlying reasons and necessity m the amendments and the purposes to be accomplished.''
Since political parties are not specifically mentioned in
the Right to Work Act, the Trial Court had to decide
whether the act included political parties. The meaning
of "or other associations" lhad to be determined. Is a political party an "association" within the meaning of the
act?
The Trial Court held that so to find would "result in
finding an unreasonable and absurd intention on the part
of the legislature.'' It would hamstring elected officials
and a huge segment of public employees- would be left with
no statutory law fixing their work standards and tenure.
The Trial Judge simply says that the legislature could not
have intended such an absurd result.
Appellants frankly concede at page 8 of their brief that
their case rests upon the premise that the phrase "or any
other type of association" is all inclusive. Suppose some
particular church had a policy to hire only ministers who
were members of that church or, saying it in another way,
had a policy not to hire ministers of any other faith but
their own. Under the Appellants' interpretation the church
could not refuse to hire ministers for this reason because
such refusal would violate the Right to Work Law. This
absurd result is a sample of the multitude of ridiculous and
unintended situations which would attend the application
of the statute if appellants' inte11>retation were correct.
That the c:ourt may reject an unreasonable or absurd
construction of a statute is set forth in 50 Am Jur (Statutes) Sec. 377, p. 385-389, where the text says in part at
p. 385-387:
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"A statute subject to iJ.lterpretation is presumed
not to have been intended to produce absurd consequences, but to have th€1 most reasonable operati~
that its language permits, and it is a general~rule that
where a statute is ambiguous in terms and fairly susceptible of two constructions, the Wlreasonableness or
absurdity which may follow one ~oonstrnction or the
other may properly be ~considered. In some eases involving the construction of a statute, considerations
of what is reasonable are even regarded as having
potent influence. If possible, doubtlul provisions should
be given a reasonable, rational, sensible, and intelligent construction. Unreasonable, absurd, or nd1eu-~ .
lous ~consequences should be avoided."
This Court approves this principle and so announced
in Norvill vs. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah·170; 97 Pac.
2nd 937, referred to -in Appellants' brief at p. 11 and also in
Rowley vs. Public Ser\.rice Commission, Supra.

POINT II
THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTENT .po NOT REQillRE THE IN,CLUSION OF ALL 'fy,PES OF ASSOCIATIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACf.
Respondents submit that Utah's Right to Work Statute was intended to cover only labor organizations and not
political parties and all other organizations. U. C. A. 3416-2 reads:
"It is hereby declared to be the public policy of
the State of Utah that the right of persons to work
. . . shall not be denied . . . on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union, labor organization or any other type of organization . . . "
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The rule of statutory construction called Ejusdem
Generis (of the same kind, class or nature) ean reasonably
and justifiably be applied to this statute and to the Right
to Work Law in general. The statute would then read:
''The . . . right . . . to work . . . shall not be denied . . . on account of membership oc non-membership in any labor union, labor organization, or any
other type of (labor) organization.''
The general rule is set forth in 82 CJS Sec. 332 p. 658
and in 50 Am. Jm. Sec. 249 p. 244-246 where the following
appears:

"General and specific words in a statute whi~1-I are
associated together, and which are capable of an analogous meaning, take ·color from each other, so that
the general words are restricted to a sense analogous
to the less general. Under this rule, general terms in
a statute may be regarded as limited by subsequent
more specific terms. Similarly, in accordance with
what is ·commonly known as the rule of Ejusden1 Generis, where, in a statute, general words follow a designation of partieular subjects or classes of persons, the
meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designation and as including only things or persons of the same kind, class, character, or nature as
those specifically enumerarted. The general words are
deemed to have been used, not to the wide extent which
they might bear if standing alone, but as related to
words of more definite and particular mea.rrlng \vith
which they are associated. In accordance with the
rule of Ejusdem Generis, such tenns as "other," other
thing," "other persons," "otheiWise," or "any other,"
when preceded by a specific enumeration, are con1monly given a restricted meaning, and limited to ar-
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ticles of the same nature as .those previously described.
The rule of Ejusdem Generis has been declared to be
specific application of the broader maxim of ''noscitur
a sociis,'' which is discussed in other sections of this
subdivision.''
A 'collection of cases on the doctrine is set forth in 14
Words and Phrases at p. 212-221.
This Court has recently approved and applied the doctrine in Donahue vs. Warner Brothers P!ictures Distributing Corporation, 272 Pac. 2nd 177, 2 Utah 2nd 256; W. S.
Hatch Company vs. Public Servi-ce Commission, 277 Pac.
2nd 809, 3 ·Utah 2nd 7 and Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Incorporated vs. Love, 300 Pac. 2nd 628, 5 Utah 2nd
270.

With respect to the proffered exhibit 1, a letter sent
by the then Governor, J. Bracken Lee, the Court properly
excluded the evidence. First, because the letter does not
mention political parties and, therefore, is of no use to the
Court and also the same is inadmissible as incompetent (T.
65, 66) . Is this letter admissible as an "executive view" as
claimed on page 21 of Appellants' brief? In Fleming vs.
Mohawk Wrecking and Lumber Company, 331 U. S. 111,
cited by Appellants as authority for admissibility of exhibit 1, the Court was construing an act which had been
repeatedly construed by the President of the United States.
We emphasize the words "had been" since the Court was
referring to an executive experience in ,construing the act.
In E. C. Olsen Company vs. Starte Tax Commission,
109 Utah 563, 168 Pac. 2nd 324, also cited by Appellants
as authority for the admission of exhibit 1, the Court states
at page 332 in 168 Pac. 2nd that:
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'.'Where there is an ambiguity in the 'statute as
to wh€!1Jher the latter does or does not cover a partie. ,ula~ , m~r _a praJCtieal construction~··: of· rthe. ·statute
;shown to 'have been the accepted construction of the
agency charged with administering the matters in question under the statute will be one factor which the
Court may take into consideration as persuasive as to
the meaning of the statute."
, The Court then found that the facts of that case "do
not show a practieal interpretation of the statute by the
Tax Commission.''
It is submitted that forn1er Governor Lee's opinion of· the legal meaning of the startute given tiefore passag~ of the act in a letter to legislators and other interested per~
sons is not "practical interpretation of the statuteH and is a legal conclusion (T. 62, 63) .
For the same reason oral testimony about what_ the
former Governor believed the law to have meant prio·r to
its passage, was also properly excluded by the Trial CoUrt.··_·
POINT

m

·POLITICAL PARTIES ARE. NOT. CONTEMPLATED·
BY THE ACT.

Respondents coneede that the Utah Right to Work statute has different wording than other Right to; Work Statutes. Urtah ·has made the act apply to the State and to its
politi·cal subdivisions and doeS so by Specifically defining · ·
employer to include all persons, ~sJ ·. assQci.ations, -~
rations, the Starte of Utah, irts counties, ·cities, school districts, and other political subdivisions. If the, legislature
·had intended the act to apply to political parties, it could
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have made it crystal clear by simply saying so. Merely because the legislature broadened the meaning of employer
to include the State and its subdivisions, does not per se
mean that every conceivable kind of association is subject
to the act.
Respondents submit that while the opinion of the distinguished President of the Chwch of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is interesting and perhaps states a concept
many would agree with, such statement is not in the record and in any event ·is of no probative value in determining the intent of the legislature in this case.
POINT IV
EVEN IF THIE STATUTE WERE TO COVER POLITICAL PARTIES, IT WAS NOT VIOLATED SINCE
THE APPELLANTS WERE DISCHARGED FOR 1WO
REASONS, ONE POLITICAL AND THE OTHER NO·NPOLITICAL.
The Trial Court f.ound as a fact that the Appellants
were fired for two reasons--one for membership in the
Demreratic party and lack of membership in the Republican party, and the other because the supervising County
Commissioner felt that the Appellants could not be loyal
(Findings of Fact No.8). Commissioner Jones felt he could
not expect loyalty from the men who had contributed substantial sums to unseat him (T. 33).
The brief of Appellants correctly states on page 3 that
Appellants asserted aJt the trial that they were fired because
they were members of the Democratic party and not members of the Republican party. The second amended petiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion which sets out Appellants' contentions in the pleadings
flatly asserts at paragraph 6 that:
"The depriving of the petitioners of their said employment, as aforesaid, was effected because of their
association with and active support of, the Democratic
party in Utah County, contrary to and in violation of
said statute."

One might compare this situation to one where a union ofilcial disliked by management is fired for two reasons: membership in a union and stealing from the employer. Surely this discharge would not violate a Right to Work
Law. The Right to Work Law eovers only that situation
where the sole reason for discharge is membership or nonmembership in a labor union or labor organization.
Likewise, here, where such a dual motive prompted
the discharge, the law was not violated even if it be assumed that political parties were intended to be covered
by the statute.
POINT V
IF UTAH'S "RIGHT TO W01RK" LAW IS INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE POLITICAL PARTIES WITHIN
THE PHRASE ". . . ANY OTHER TYPE OF ASSOCIATION . . .'' IT IS AN UNCO·NSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE
OF THE PO·LICE POWER.

The constitutionality of the "Right to Work" Laws
has been repeatedly affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court.
The leading case ('really two cases considered tog~ther) is
Lincoln Federal Labor Union vs. Northwestern Iron and ·
Metal Company, 335 U. S. 525, 69 S. Ct. 251 (1959). This
case involved a North Carolina statute and a Nebraska

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

constitutional amendment which provided that no person
in those states shall be denied an opportunity to obtain or
retain employment because he is or is not a member of a
labor ~anization. The constitutionality of the laws was
affirmed. The Courts said it had:
". . . consciously returned closer and closer to
the earlier constitutional ·Principle that states have
power to regulate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business
affail's, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some
specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some
valid federal law. Just as we ~have held that the due
process clause erects no obstaJcle to block legislative
protection of union members, we now hold that 1~
lative protection can be afforded non-union workers."
A long string of decisions have followed this case. All
cases have been limited to labor troubles with some type of
labor organization involved. In no case found has any
Court even suggested applying the "Right rto Work" Laws.
to other than labor organizations.
There is little doubt as to the constitutionality of state
laws which operate under the police power and which regulate economic affairs, and, in particular, regulate evil practices in labor fields. This, however, does not mean tJhart
all state regulation in the laJbor field is constitutional; it
is only constitutional if it is not unreasonable, or capricious,
or arbitrary and the means selected have a real and substantial relation to rthe object sought to be obtained. If,
" . . . any other type of association . . . " is inrterpreted
to mean a political party (or any other group that is not
connected with labor) then it becomes unreasonable and
arbitrary, and is unconstitutional as an invalid exercise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the police power because i1 limits personal greedoms

guaranteed by the United States and Utah State COnstitutions. It would limit freedom without any real evil to
be corrected. To say that irt: is reasonaJble and non-wbitrary to put limitations on labor unions is far different than
to say it is reasonable and non-arbitrary to put rthe same
limitations on all organizations of whatever kind or nature.
A further consideration as to whether political parties
should be included within the statute is the nature of po-

litical parties themselves. In Yuratich vs. Palaguemines
Parish Dem. Exec. Com., La. App., 32 So. 2nd 647, 652,
the Court noted that:
"A political party is a voluntary association of individuaJs organized for purposes of furthering particular politieal or economic beliefs."
United States vs. Shirley, D. C. Pa., 168 F. Supp. 382,
385 defined a political party as:
"a body of persons associated for the purpose of promoting certain views, opinions or principles with respect to the government and is not a person, fum, or
a corporation."
How ~can a political party satisfactorily promote its
political and economic views and opinions if its hands are
tied with respect to whom its candidates can hire and fire?
There is northing inherently bad in the "spoils" system. The
candidates of the party which wins hire those to work for
them who have worked for and who hold co·mmon views.
At ti·mes, the legislature has specifically withdrawn certain
jobs from this system, but has put them under a merit system when doing so. Some political personalities are elec-
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ted specifically because they stand on a policy of ''housecleaning their departments ~to eliminate dead wood.'' This·
right or .power should not be taken :from elected officials
unless it is the clear intent of the legislature rto take it
away. Without leaving a merit system ~in its place leaves
"dead wood" to accwnulate. It is not clear in this case
that it was the intent of the legislature to include political
parties. Rather, fue· weight of evidence indicates that irt
was not their intent to include politioal parties. S1Jarte ex·
rei Corrigan vs. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company, 157 northeast 2nd 331, 333, 169 Ohio State 42 defined a political party as.
''an association of indiV!iduals whose primary purposes
are to promote or accomplish elections or appointments to public offices, positions or jobs."

To give an interpretation to the law which would liinit
political parties and thus, elected officials so that they could
not accomplish some of their goals by lrlring and firing
would be arbitrary and unreasonable and thus, violate both
the United States and Utah State Constitutions.

CONCLUSION

Respondents believe the phrase ''any other type of association'' should be interpreted in accordance wifth the rules
of Ejusdem Generis. The phrase would then read ''any
other type of (laJbor) association''. This interpretation
would exclude political parties from coverage by the act.

Respondents believe that if the phrase does mean all
associations as contended by the Appellants that the statute would be absurd and unreaso11a1ble and the Court is
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justified in adopting an interpretation which would not require absurd and unreasonable consequences.
Respondents further take the posi!tion that even if political parties were included within the coverage of the act
that the statute was not even violated since Appellants
were fired for two reasons: membership in the political party and because Commissioner Jones felt they could not be
loyal to him, their supervising Commissioner.
Finally, Appellants urge that if Utah's Right to Work
Laws is interpreted to include political parties, it is an unconstitutional exercise of the state police power.
Respondents feel that the decision of the Trial Court
can be supported on any one of the above listed grounds.
ARNOLD C. ROYLANCE
Utah County Attorney
RICHARD M. TAYLOR
275 North Main Street
Spanish Fork, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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